The innovation deficit in public services : the curious problem of too much efficiency and not enough waste and failure

It has long been recognised that government and public sector services suffer an innovation deficit compared to private or market-based services. This paper argues that this can be explained as an unintended consequence of the concerted public sector drive toward the elimination of waste through efficiency, accountability and transparency. Yet in an evolving economy this can be a false efficiency, as it also eliminates the 'good waste' that is a necessary cost of experimentation. This results in a systematic trade0off in the public sector between the static efficiency of minimizing the misuse of public resources and the dynamic efficiency of experimentation. this is inherently biased against risk and uncertainty and therein, explains why governments find service innovation so difficult. In the drive to eliminate static inefficiencies, many political systems have susequently overshot and stifled policy innovation. I propose the 'Red Queen' solution of adaptive economic policy.

A review of rationale for allocating costs and payments in producing and supplying public sector information

Presentation given by Dr John S Cook at the Queensland Spatial Conference 2008, Global Warming: What’s Happening in Paradise?, held at Holiday Inn, Surfers Paradise,Queensland from 17-19 July, 2008 This presentation provides some semblance of an information infrastructure that is aligned generally to problems of governance in complex organisations.

Traceability : retracing law and public policy on measurement standards

This presentation outlines key aspects of public policy in broad terms insofar as they relate to establishment, implementation and compliance with legal measurement standards. It refers in particular to traceability of a legal measurement unit from its source in a single international standard as a compliance issue. It comments on accreditation of legal measurement and liability concerned with errors in measurement.

A summary view of government cost recovery policies in Australia and New Zealand relating to the supply of public sector information

Researching administrative history is problematical. A trail of authoritative documents is often hard to find; and useful summaries can be difficult to organise, especially if source material is in paper formats in geographically dispersed locations. In the absence of documents, the reasons for particular decisions and the rationale underpinning particular policies can be confounded as key personnel advance in their professions and retire. The rationale for past decisions may be lost for practical purposes; and if an organisation’s memory of events is diminished, its learning through experience is also diminished. Publishing this document tries to avoid unnecessary duplication of effort by other researchers that need to venture into how policies of charging for public sector information have been justified. The author compiled this work within a somewhat limited time period and the work does not pretend to be a complete or comprehensive analysis of the issues.----- A significant part of the role of government is to provide a framework of legally-enforceable rights and obligations that can support individuals and non-government organisations in their lawful activities. Accordingly, claims that governments should be more ‘business-like’ need careful scrutiny. A significant supply of goods and services occurs as non-market activity where neither benefits nor costs are quantified within conventional accounting systems or in terms of money. Where a government decides to provide information as a service; and information from land registries is archetypical, the transactions occur as a political decision made under a direct or a clearly delegated authority of a parliament with the requisite constitutional powers. This is not a market transaction and the language of the market confuses attempts to describe a number of aspects of how governments allocate resources.----- Cost recovery can be construed as an aspect of taxation that is a sole prerogative of a parliament. The issues are fundamental to political constitutions; but they become more complicated where states cede some taxing powers to a central government as part of a federal system. Nor should the absence of markets be construed necessarily as ‘market failure’ or even ‘government failure’. The absence is often attributable to particular technical, economic and political constraints that preclude the operation of markets. Arguably, greater care is needed in distinguishing between the polity and markets in raising revenues and allocating resources; and that needs to start by removing unhelpful references to ‘business’ in the context of government decision-making.

The evolution of tax morale in modern Spain

This paper studies the evolution of tax morale in Spain in the post-France era. In contrast to the previous tax compliance literature, the current paper investigates tax morale as the dependent variable and attempts to answer what actually shapes tax morale. Te analysis uses suevey data from two sources; the World Values Survey and the European Values Survey, allowing us to observe tax morale in Spain for the years 1981,1990, 1995 and 1999/2000. The sutudy of evolution of tax morale in Spain over nearly a 20-year span is particularly interesting because the political and fiscal system evolved very rapidly during this period.

Health, endogenous time preference, and inequality : a political economy perspective

We study an overlapping-generations model in which agents' mortality risks, and consequently impatience, are endogenously determined by private and public investment in health care. Revenues allocated for public health care arc determined by a voting process. We find that the degree of substitutability between public and private health expenditures matters for macroeconomic outcomes of the model. Higher substitutability implies a “crowding-out" effect, which in turn impacts adversely on morality risks and impatience leading to lower public expenditures on health care in the political equilibrium. Consequently, higher substitutability is associated with greater polarization in wealth, and long-run distributions that are bimodal.

Spatial information infrastructure : what can it possibly mean?

Investment begins with imagining that doing something new in the present will lead to a better future. Investment can vary from incidental improvements as safe and beneficial side-effects of current activity through to a more dedicated and riskier disinvestment in current methods of operation and reinvestment in new processes and products. The role of government has an underlying continuity determined by its constitution that authorises a parliament to legislate for peace, order and good government. ‘Good government’ is usually interpreted as improving the living standards of its citizens. The requirements for social order and social cohesion suggest that improvements should be shared fairly by all citizens through all of their lives. Arguably, the need to maintain an individual’s metabolism has a social counterpart in the ‘collective metabolism’ of a sustainable and productive society.

Equal Factor Equivalence in Economies with Multiple Public Goods.

We consider the problem of provisioon and cost-sharing of multiple public goods. the efficient equal factor equivalent allocation rule makes every agent indifferent between what he receives and the opportunity of choosing the bundle of public goods subject to the constraint of paying r times its cost, where r is set as low as possible.

The economics of credence goods: An experimental investigation of the role of verifiability, liability, competition and reputation in credence goods markets

Credence goods markets are characterized by asymmetric information between sellers and consumers that may give rise to inefficiencies, such as under- and overtreatment or market break-down. We study in a large experiment with 936 participants the determinants for efficiency in credence goods markets. While theory predicts that either liability or verifiability yields efficiency, we find that liability has a crucial, but verifiability only a minor effect. Allowing sellers to build up reputation has little influence, as predicted. Seller competition drives down prices and yields maximal trade, but does not lead to higher efficiency as long as liability is violated.

Public Economics and the Assessment of Tourism Developments and Policies

Public economics covers both topics in welfare economic of social (as opposed to private) interest and aspects of public finance. This chapter considers the application of two methods of social economic evaluation of tourist developments, namely, social cost-benefit analysis and economic impact analysis. The role of social cost-benefit analysis in the assessment of tourism is illustrated by its application to the evaluation of inbound tourism. This is followed by a discussion of taxes on tourism and subsidies to promote it. The principle focus is on hotel room taxes. The analysis of taxes on tourism involves both public finance and welfare economics issues. The scope for and desirability of applying the user-pays principle to tourism is then examined.

The economics of credence goods : an experiment on the role of liability, verifiability, reputation and competition

Credence goods markets are characterized by asymmetric information between sellers and consumers that may give rise to inefficiencies, such as under- and overtreatment or market breakdown. We study in a large experiment with 936 participants the determinants for efficiency in credence goods markets. While theory predicts that liability or verifiability yield efficiency, we find that liability has a crucial, but verifiability at best a minor, effect. Allowing sellers to build up reputation has little influence, as predicted. Seller competition drives down prices and yields maximal trade, but does not lead to higher efficiency as long as liability is violated. (JEL D12, D82)